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Abstract  
 
This article discusses the state and trends of health care in Armenia. It presents previous and 
current health policies and focuses on future development options. The focus of Armenian 
authorities and international donors is to emphasize the role of primary health care, which implies 
providing more resources to the outpatient care and establishing the Family Medicine at the 
primary health care level. The Republic of Armenia is facing the challenge of improving the 
access to and the quality of the basic medical services to its poorest population. Technically the 
poor are eligible to receive health care; however, insufficient public funds, the low quality of the 
medical staff and informal payments prevent them from getting adequate care. The article 
describes the negative effects of widespread use of informal payments in health care and possible 
steps to reduce it. It analyzes topics such as, feasibility of private and public health insurance, 
rationalization of hospital care, privatization of the health sector, the role of government and 
budget allocation to health care. 
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represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
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   HEALTH CARE IN ARMENIA: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 
 
 
An important challenge that the Republic of Armenia is facing is to adopt a health 
care system, where everyone in the society, including the poor, has access to health 
services. One aspect of this challenge is the declining trend of the utilization rate of 
health services by sick individuals. An explanation for this decline is the increasing 
amounts of formal and informal payments that sick individuals have to make to the health 
institutions, while at the same time, there is a continuing high rate of poverty in Armenia. 
If current trends continue, health care in Armenia will increasingly become a privilege for 
the rich. The result is the deterioration of health care system during the past decade.  
In the first part of this article, we will present the conditions of health care in 
Armenia. Part two discusses health care policy focusing on the need for optimization of 
the health institutions, such as hospitals and polyclinics. The third part deals with the 
effects of market failures focusing mainly on health insurance, and the last part discusses 
the important role of primary health care in Armenia. 
 
 
THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE IN ARMENIA 
 
Despite severe economic shocks, such as 60 percent fall of the real GDP from 
1991 to 1993, and pervasive poverty during the transition period, and despite the fact that 
the level of public expenditures for health care was and still is the lowest in the region, 
and that the quality and utilization of the health services had deteriorated, the health 
indicators in Armenia, especially those relating to mortality and male life expectancy, 
showed gradual improvement over the decade, and in some instances they compare 
favorably to other countries with similar or even higher levels of income. 
Mortality has remained stable, except for maternal mortality. Early childhood 
mortality has declined over the past decade and compares well with other transition 
countries. Life expectancy at birth has remained high, which was estimated at 70.9 for 
men and 75.7 for women during 2000 (see table 1.).  While male life expectancy 
compares favorably with the European and Central Asia, ECA, countries’ average of 66.7 
years, female life expectancy is similar to the regional average of 75.3 years (UNICEF 
2002.)   
 
 
Table 1: Armenia: Selected health status indicators 
 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Female life expectancy at birth (years) 75.2 75.9 76.2 77.3 78.1 75.5 75.7 75.9 
Male life expectancy at birth (years) 68.4 68.9 69.3 70.3 70.8 70.7 70.9 71.0 
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births) 40.1 34.7 20.8 38.7 25.4 32.9 52.7 18.8 
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births) 18.5 14.2 15.5 15.4 14.7 15.4 15.6 15.4 
Source: UNICEF, Social Monitor 2002, Innocenti Research Center, Florence, Italy, 2002.   Figures for the 
years 2000-2002 are based on Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2002.  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Mortality indicators in Armenia should be treated with a degree of caution. There 
are significant differences between population based surveys and official estimates.  
Mortality estimates from Armenia Demographic and Health Survey 2000, ADHS 2000, 
for five-year averages (1996-2000) for infant mortality rates is 36 per 1,000 live births, 
which is more than twice the official figures during the same period (See Table 1.)  The 
discrepancies between the two sets of data could be explained by different approaches 
used in measuring the outcomes. There is a difference in methodology in measuring the 
infant mortality by health providers in Armenia and foreign agencies such as UNICEF. 
Even though Armenia officially adopted the World Health Organization definition and 
procedures related to calculation of infant mortality rate, in real life the health providers 
still did not fully adopt them and used Soviet measurement. The Ministry of Health is 
planning to train and monitor health personnel on the classification and registration of 
stillbirths and infant deaths. It is also planning to introduce changes in the regulations that 
govern the registration of infant deaths to make the infant death registration process 
easier. 
Health status indicators reflect significant differences between rural and urban 
areas. According to the ADHS 2000, during 1990’s the urban infant mortality rate was 
35.9 per 1000 live birth, while the rural rate was 52.7, which reflects reduced access in 
rural areas to adequate antenatal care and supervised delivery. In rural areas, about 11 
percent did not receive any antenatal care, compared to only 4 percent in urban areas. 
While almost all births in urban areas occur in health care settings, 15 percent of births in 
rural areas occur at home, of which about 30 percent were unassisted by health 
professionals. These differences in child mortality might be explained by the impact of 
three major factors linked to poverty: access to affordable health care, mother’s 
education, and nutrition.  
 
From an epidemiological standpoint, Armenia has a disadvantageous disease 
burden with features of both developed and developing countries.  Major adult diseases 
are similar to those in industrial countries: cardiovascular disease, hypertension and 
accidents.  At the same time, infectious and parasitic diseases are increasing, especially 
after 1995. The increased incidence of malaria and tuberculosis in Armenia reflects the 
deterioration of preventive care. The number of documented tuberculosis cases increased 
from 600 in 1989 to 1350 in 2000.  
 
 
HEALTH CARE POLICY IN ARMENIA 
 
The economic crisis that Armenia faced after independence had a significant 
impact on the health sector resulting in a dramatic decrease in the level of health 
expenditures and a deterioration of the health system. During this period, budgetary 
spending on health care plunged from about 2.7 percent of the GDP in 1990 to 1.3% in 
1997 (TNO, 2000.)   
In order to improve health care in Armenia, one of the priorities of the 
government’s health policy is to increase public funds allocated to the health sector. As 
envisaged in the Poverty Reduction Strategy recently adopted by the government, for the 
period of 2004-2015 the public expenditures will display growth, with an average of 14% 
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per annum. In 2015, compared to 2003, public expenditures in the health sector as a 
percentage of the GDP will increase by 1.1 percentage points to reach the program target 
of 2.5% of GDP in 2015 (See table 2.) The main sources of such growth in public 
expenditures in the health sector will be the collection of revenues from domestic sources 
and projects financed from foreign sources.  
 
Table 2. Program indicators of state budget expenditures in the health sector 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2009 2012 2015
Total, billion drams 21.0 24.9 30.8 35.5 52.7 73.3 101.1
% of GDP 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.5
% of state budget expenditures 6.5 7.6 8.6 9.2 10.2 10.9 11.9
Year-on-year % change 31.2 18.6 23.5 15.4 12.4 11.5 11.2
Source, Government of Armenia, 2003. 
 
 Taking into consideration the higher rate of accessibility of primary health care 
(out-patient and polyclinic) and its physical proximity to the population, the intra-sectoral 
redistribution of public expenditures will be carried out with the increase of state budget 
financing of primary health care. Both hospital and primary health care systems, 
including family doctors, will have as priorities the health of mothers and children, and 
the mitigation of socially significant diseases. 
The strong emphasis on hospital care in the past and observed decline in 
utilization led the government of Armenia to introduce the reform process in the health 
sector with three major concepts: (i) introduction of Basic Benefit Package; (ii) 
optimization of the health care system; (iii) privatization of health care facilities.   
 
 Basic Benefit Package and Informal Payments 
 
Since 1993 hospitals were allowed to sell health services to the public and 
generate revenues. To provide support to the poor, the government created a program 
called Basic Benefit Package, BBP, which identified health services that should be 
provided without charge to a list of vulnerable groups or categories, such as, disabled, 
orphans under 18, veterans and families of war victims, families with more than three 
children, children under 18 with one parent. Members of the vulnerable groups, in 
principle, were allowed to get free health care at hospitals, while the rest of the public 
paid fees, except for treatment of emergency cases and diseases of social significance, 
like Sexually Transmitted Diseases, STDs, tuberculosis and malaria.  Basic health 
services at polyclinics were and still are free for everyone, poor and non-poor, while the 
lab tests are for fee for those not included in the BBP.  
As of January 2001, the Government of Armenia extended the free-of charge BBP 
program eligibility to the beneficiaries of the poverty family benefit system, which is a 
government adopted means tested benefit program. Preliminary analysis of 2001  
Integrated Leaving Conditions Survey, ILCS, in Armenia shows that this policy change 
might have improved access to health care among the poor. However, the effects would 
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be possible to examine only once the final results become available (Murrugara and 
Posarac, 2002.)  
 In general countries with higher per capita income tend to adopt national health 
insurance, while poor countries adopt programs that target the poor. Targeting and 
excluding those who are outside the targeted group increases the cost of administering the 
program. However targeting the poor, instead of providing public health care to both poor 
and non-poor, decreases the overall cost of reducing poverty (Van the Walle 1995.)  A 
disadvantage of adopting health programs that are targeting just the poor and exclude the 
non-poor is the possible resentment of the middle class taxpayers, which could reduce the 
political support for the poverty reduction programs.  
On behalf of the poor, the State Health Agency makes payments to the hospitals 
and polyclinics. However the amount of payments by the State Health Agency to the 
health institutions covers about 45% of the cost of the health services (World Bank, 
2003.) This implies that the health institutions should generate revenues indirectly. One 
method is to collect informal payments from patients including the poor and the 
vulnerable groups. In this case hospitals and polyclinics would collect payments for the 
services provided to the poor and the vulnerable groups from both the patients and the 
government. During 1999 about 91 percent of hospital patients made informal payments 
(Lewis, 2000.) The result was that between 1996 and 1999 the free of charge health care 
provided by the government wasn’t able to prevent 21 percent drop in the health care 
utilization rate among the largest vulnerable group, families with four or more children. 
However, the fee-waiver program had a small but statistically significant positive impact 
on the access to health care by the vulnerable groups (Chaudhury, 2003.) Another 
negative impact of informal payments is a lack of funds for physical investment and run 
down hospitals and polyclinics because informal payments are made to the medical 
personnel and not the institutions. 
 
 Optimization of Health Institutions  
 
Only a fraction of the capacity of a large number of hospitals, hospital beds, 
nurses and doctors is being used. During 1999 the occupancy rate of the 171 hospitals in 
the country with 23,169 beds was about 40 percent (MOH, 2002a.) Table 3 shows the 
significant drop in the number of patients admitted to the hospitals, while table 4 shows 
the drastic reduction in the use of polyclinics.  From 1992 to 2002 there was about a 
seventy five percent drop in the number of visits to polyclinics.  
 
     Table 3 
 Number of Patients admitted to Hospitals 
     (Thousands) 
 
1992 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02  
            
354 305 285 281 284 252 235 221 192 187 193 
 
Source, Ministry of Health, 2003 
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     Table 4 
   Number of Visits to Polyclinics  
       (Millions) 
 
1992 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 
 
20.2 18.5 17.2 16.4 15.8 10.8 7.9 7.5 6.7 5.8 5.4 
 
Source, Ministry of Health, 2003 
 
 
These numbers could imply that there is an oversupply of hospitals in Armenia 
and that some hospitals should be closed. The excess capacity of hospital beds reflects 
the fact that during the Soviet period the government payment to a hospital was based on 
the number of bed that the hospital maintains. This gave an incentive to build large 
hospitals with many beds. Another factor in the decrease of patients admitted to the 
health care institutions was the significant migration of the population of Armenia during 
the past decade. 
Others argue that the problem is not oversupply of hospitals, but lower demand of 
health services, underconsumption, because about half of Armenia’s population is 
extremely poor or poor and they can’t afford to pay the hospital fees (European, 2001.) 
If the cause of overcapacity of hospitals is unaffordability, and low demand, then 
hospitals shouldn’t be closed down. Instead the government should find ways to provide 
opportunity to the poor to be able to use hospital care when they need it. At the same 
time if Armenia’s rapid economic growth rate continues and the benefits of this rapid 
growth starts to trickle down to the poor, then affordability will increase and hospital 
occupancy rate would increase. 
 Probably the reality is between these two extremes of oversupply and low 
demand; therefore, the government should take measures to reduce the supply of health 
institutions and to increase demand. This implies that the Ministry of Health has the 
difficult task to reduce the number of hospitals to an optimum levels. One way of 
achieving optimization is through consolidation of hospitals that are assigned to perform 
one specific task, such as consolidating pediatric and maternity hospitals (MOH, 2002a.) 
During Fall 2003 the government of Armenia began to take measures to consolidate 
health institutions.   
There is an oversupply of doctors in Armenia and their official pay is very low. 
There is one medical school, which is accredited by the Ministry of health, and that 
school is public, while there are seven accredited nursing schools. In order to reduce the 
quantity of physicians the Health ministry was cutting the number of medical students 
who do not pay tuition, called “state order places” in medical school. That number was 
reduced from 700 students in 1992 to 250 in 1995 (European, 2001.)  
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Privatization of Health Institutions 
 
Another aspect of the optimization of health institutions is the privatization 
process, which happened mostly in the hospital sector in Yerevan and pharmacies all over 
the country. It appeared that the privatization of individual hospitals with legal 
requirements to continue to provide health care services went unchecked and counter to 
hospital sector optimization policy. The privatization process didn’t address the problem 
of overcapacity of hospitals. 
In addition, the privatization of hospitals through direct sale to the staff at heavily 
discounted prices (75%) were not transparent and were not organized efficiently. It failed 
to motivate insiders to develop a sound business plan based on a thorough consideration 
of strategic options.  The process was not structured to mobilize competition, resources 
for investment needs, nor to bring to the sector credible private owners. 
With the consultation of the World Bank, the government decided to postpone the 
privatization process and review the health sector privatization strategy to address current 
gaps such as: lack of links between privatization and hospital rationalization, lack of 
regulatory functions of the government in health sector with significant autonomy and 
private participation, lack of transparency of privatization transactions, and lack of 
clarifications of State Health Agency service contract guarantees to privatized 
institutions. 
Once the numbers of hospitals, doctors and nurses are reduced and consolidation 
of hospitals occurs, and at the same time government budget allocation to the health 
sector increases, then the salaries of physicians, nurses, and medical staff will increase 
and government expenditures on health care will be divided among a smaller number of 
hospitals, and medical personnel, covering a larger percentage of health care expenses per 
patient.  This will reduce the pressure on hospitals and polyclinics to collect informal 
payments from the patients including the poor.  
We could conclude that in order to increase the accessibility of health care by the 
poor, optimization of the health system should occur. This will be achieved first by 
closing a few hospitals through consolidation. Second, government expenditures on 
health care should increase and finally salaries of medical personnel should go up.  
 
 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
In the health care sector there are circumstances where the market fails to provide 
services or provides them with insufficient amounts generating justifications for 
government involvement. In Armenia, where the economy is in transition from centrally 
commend economy to a market economy, markets and appropriate institutions, such as 
legal and financial, are not fully developed yet; therefore, market failures are more 
common. The result is a heavy burden on the government to correct market failures and 
adopt policies, which will make health care more affordable to the poor. Correcting 
market failures in the health sector improves the efficiency of the economy and promotes 
equity. At the same time the government should contribute to the development of market 
institutions, such as legal and financial.  
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Beside the market failures, another difficulty that Armenia is facing is the 
existence of an elaborate shadow economy and a large amount of government failure. 
Therefore a well-intentioned government policy might fail because it ignores government 
failure and the conditions in the real world. In many situations both the market and the 
government would generate inefficiency and unfairness. Therefore, the question 
shouldn’t be which system is fair or efficient, instead we should discuss and determine if 
efficiency and fairness could be improved more through imperfect markets or an 
imperfect government. 
We will focus on three areas where the market fails. First there is large positive 
externality in providing immunization, fighting infectious diseases, maintaining clean air, 
providing clean water, adequate sewage disposal, urban sanitation, hospital care for 
catastrophic illnesses and education about basic public health issues. In Armenia during 
the past decade, through specific programs most of the children received vaccines for 
basic health diseases. 
 
Imperfect Information 
 
 The second type of market failure in the health care sector is imperfect 
information. Patients have a limited amount of information about their illnesses, the cost 
to cure their illnesses , and the competence of the physicians. For this reason in Armenia 
the government determines prices of basic health services and provides licenses to 
competent physicians and makes sure that incompetent physicians are not practicing 
medicine. Physicians are supposed to act in the interest of their patients. In a sense 
physicians are the agents of the patients. However if the interests of the physicians are 
different from the interests of the patients, then we will have a case of principal and agent 
problem. The source of the problem is the fact that physicians are advisors to patients and 
at the same providers of health care, which creates a conflict of interest. Instead of 
protecting the interest of patients, physicians might try to increase their revenue by 
providing medical care that patients don’t need.  
In Armenia, in order to increase their revenues, some doctors are aggressively 
looking for patients and acting like “patient hunters.” This behavior is the result of the 
drastic reduction of patients at health institutions and the oversupply of physicians. Some 
of the physicians are recommending unnecessary procedures or are not disclosing the full 
cost of the operation at the beginning of the treatment and refusing to complete it without 
additional payments. Clearly there is significant amount of market failure and there is 
need for government regulations. A positive result of the increasing role of market in the 
health sector is that some physicians are trying to raise their revenue by building a good 
reputation and attracting more patients. They are providing good medical advice and 
good care and expecting that patients will bring more patients (Lewis, 2000.)   
 
Health Insurance 
 
The third market failure occurs in the health insurance sector. In Armenia 
insurance industries are not developed yet, and the market fails to provide adequate 
amounts of health insurance. In the private health insurance market, insurance providers 
have less information about the health conditions and the life style of insurance buyers 
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than the buyers. This asymmetric information generates the problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, which increase the cost of insurance. In the case of adverse selection, 
individuals with health problems would be able to hide their true risk level and cause 
premiums of the group to rise, which would induce low risk individuals to drop out of 
health insurance market. In the case of moral hazard, once individuals buy health 
insurance, they face the temptation to overuse health services, causing overconsumption 
and higher costs for the insurance companies.  
In a transition economy, such as Armenia, where the markets and corresponding 
institutions are not fully developed yet, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
would be significant. Therefore in Armenia, the market literally fails to provide health 
insurance.  At the same time a significant portion of the population couldn’t afford to buy 
private health insurance, and current tax laws do not give incentives to the employers to 
provide health insurance to its employees (European, 2001.) 
A solution to this market failure is public health insurance. The Ministry of Health 
prepared a proposal to introduce public health insurance in Armenia. The report indicates 
that the existing state of health care in Armenia does not satisfies the medical needs of the 
poor, “The present system of free medical care is mainly declarative and not trusted by 
the population and health care workers” (MOH, 2002b.) The report advocates the 
adoption of a Compulsory Medical Insurance system, which would be funded mainly 
through a tax or a premium based on each employee’s income. Two thirds of the tax 
would be paid by the employer and one third by the employee. The estimated tax is 9% of 
wages. It is suggested that initially the tax should be only 3% and in the future it should 
be raised to 9%.  
However, beside the social security taxes that employers currently pay for their 
employees’ wages and income taxes that employees pay, an additional 9% or even 3% 
tax on wages is not politically feasible. At this stage, given the government’s relatively 
low revenues, public health insurance seems to be expensive. The low income of the 
population and the existence of a shadow economy make the development of public and 
private health insurance very difficult. Currently Compulsory Medical Insurance is not 
being considered and establishing public health insurance is just a long-range goal of the 
government. In general low-income countries instead of adopting public health insurance, 
focus on public hospitals and clinics (Jack, 2002.)  
 
 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 
 
The purpose of primary health care, PHC, is to detect, diagnose and prevent 
sicknesses as early as possible. Primary health care involves education of the public about 
health issues, securing maternal and child health care, immunization and treatment of 
common and infectious diseases, providing necessary drugs and basic curative care. 
It is estimated that, in Armenia, 80% of illnesses could be cured through primary 
health care which are mainly provided through polyclinics, where specialized physicians 
work and through small clinics called ambulatories usually located in the provinces 
(MOH 2002a.) Polyclinics are owned by local governments and only few in Yerevan are 
owned by the Ministry of Health. At polyclinics the service is free to everyone, rich or 
poor.  
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Currently, in Armenia, Primary Health Care shows a mixed picture. Most urban 
polyclinics continue to operate based on the former Soviet tradition, where there are no 
family physicians. Instead each doctor is specialized in the health care needs of different 
age groups and for various specific health problems, including separate medical 
specialties for women. On the other hand, family medicine has been introduced in 
Armenia, and is planned to be the main vehicle of preventive health care. Already active 
family medicine departments function in the Ministry of Health and in the three relevant 
health educational establishments. There are pilot projects for population enrollment in 
family medicine and hundreds of trained and retrained health professionals in family 
health care. 
The Ministry of Health, MOH, is emphasizing the important role of primary 
health care and polyclinics, and therefore, is allocating more funds to them. Table 5 
shows that government is planning to increase the role of polyclinics relative to hospitals. 
The government is planning to increase the funding of polyclinics much faster than to 
hospitals. This trend would continue and in year 2006 government funding to polyclinics 
will exceed the funding of hospitals. This is remarkable, when we realize that during 
1999 government spending on hospitals was three times more than government spending 
on polyclinics.  
 
 
Table 5 
 Government Expenditures on Polyclinics and Hospitals 
   In billions of Dram 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003* 2004* 2005* 2006* 
Polyclinics 3.0 1.7 3.1 3.4 4.0 8.0 10.9 13.4 
 
Hospitals 9.3 9.4 9.5 8.9 10.6 12.1 13.5 14.3 
 
 
*--Projections 
 
Source, Ministry of  Health, 2003 
 
 
Controversies in Primary Health Care 
 
 The policy of emphasizing primary health care, generated mixed results in 
different countries; therefore, the success of PHC policy depends on the circumstances of 
a specific country (Filmer, 2000.) Public expenditure on PHC could generate poor results 
for two reasons. First government health expenditures might not translate into adequate 
health care. The main concern is the incentive of health care personnel, who receive 
public funding for their work, to provide good quality health services. Health care 
personnel, such as doctors and nurses, are alone with patients and it is difficult to monitor 
their work. This concern could be addressed in Armenia if the compensation of 
physicians is based on their performance and the patients have the right to choose their 
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own doctors. Consequently, physicians that do not provide quality health care will have 
fewer patients and less income. Therefore, they would have an incentive to provide 
quality care. 
Second, public expenditures on health care could crowd out private primary 
health care providers. This implies that even if public expenditures generate good quality 
health services, the overall effect on health care will be minor because private primary 
health services will be displaced. In Armenia this concern also is not significant because 
there are hardly any private family physicians providing primary health care. Therefore, 
government financing of primary health care would not generate a tangible amount of 
crowding out. 
 
 
Primary Health Care and the Poor 
 
Based on  research in 10 countries, in 7 of 10 countries the poorest quintile benefit 
proportionately more from primary health care than hospitals, while the highest quintile 
benefits proportionately more from hospitals than primary care. Hospital care nearly 
always benefits the rich, which implies that government expenditure on PHC will benefit 
the poor more than expenditure on hospitals. In other words, the non-poor could benefit 
more than the poor from overall public health expenditures. However the non-poor 
benefit more from public expenditure on hospitals than on PHC (Filmer, 2002.) 
In Armenia, during 1998-99, 64.4% of patients from the lowest quintile were 
treated at polyclinics, while only 47.4 percent of patients from the highest quintile were 
treated at polyclinics. Therefore, most of the poor patients went to polyclinics, however 
most of the patients of polyclinics were non-poor and the highest quintile used 
polyclinics more than the lowest quintile. The poor tend to use polyclinic services more 
often than hospitals, because informal payments at polyclinics are much lower than at the 
hospitals.  
 
Table 6. Distribution of Public Expenditures in Health, 1999, Million Dram 
 
Consumption quintiles  
1 2 3 4 5 
Total 
Hospital 1,699 1,548 1,699 2,340 5,435 12,720 
Polyclinic 780 901 894 1,000 1,424 4,999 
Diag. Ctrs. and 
other 192 527 336 288 1,007 2,349 
Total 2671 2976 2929 3628 7866 20070 
 
Source: World Bank 2003, page 125. 
 
Out of 5,000 million Dram spent by the government during 1999 on polyclinics, 
the lowest quintile received 780 million Dram while the highest quintile captured 1,424 
million Dram (Table 6.) Government expenditure on health care is regressive because the 
wealthy benefit from health services more than the poor. Only 13 percent of public health 
expenditures, 2671 out of 20070 million Dram, were used by the poorest quintile, while 
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the highest quintile used 40 percent (Table 6). The explanation is that the poor avoid 
seeking health care because they can’t afford formal and informal payments. Only 26 
percent of the sick from lowest quintile saw a physician compared to 51 percent of the 
highest quintile. It is true that mostly the non-poor uses polyclinics; however, public 
expenditure on polyclinics is the least regressive (World Bank, 2003.) 
 
 Increasing Role of Family Physicians 
 
International and foreign organizations, such as World Bank and USAID, are 
providing funds for specific projects that are aimed to improve primary health care in 
Armenia. These programs upgrade the primary health care skills of doctors and nurses 
working in polyclinics. They improve the availability of primary health care in every 
region including remote villages and improve the quality of primary health care to every 
individual and family.  
Currently when patients need care, most of them go to a hospital. In the future 
most patients will go first to a polyclinic and the family practitioner will treat them. If the 
patient needs to see a specialist or needs surgery then the family doctor will send the 
patient to a specialist or a hospital. The primary health care will be provided through 
family physicians’ group practices, while secondary and tertiary health care will be 
provided at the hospitals. The family doctors will play the role of gatekeepers for the 
secondary care (Europe, p. 42). 
Hospitals have more prestige and the perception is that doctors who work at the 
hospitals are better than doctors who work at the polyclinics. The health ministry is 
promoting the use of family doctors to provide primary health care and in order to 
improve their quality and increase their credibility is providing training to doctors in the 
primary health sector (MOH, 2000.)  This effort could change the perception that doctors 
at the polyclinics are less qualified than doctors who work at the hospitals.Through a 
World Bank project, 200 doctors from polyclinics followed a one-year education 
program. The goal is to train about 1,500 doctors to become efficient family practitioners. 
However, training 1,500 for one year and taking them away from their work is difficult. 
Therefore, the expectation is that the one-year educational program will be broken down 
into modules and the doctors will receive training in the regional training centers close to 
their residence.  
The number of cases that hospitals treat determines government compensation to 
hospitals. Before 2002 there was no upper limit for the number of patients that they could 
treat. This caused an increase in the government expenditures to hospitals and polyclinics 
because they had incentive to treat as many patients as possible. In 2002 the rule of 
funding was changed and an upper limit or cap was introduced on the level of 
government funds allocated to each hospital and clinic.  
During Soviet Union, the polyclinics were financed based on attendance. They 
tend to over report attendance to get more financing. In mid 90s per capita financing 
scheme introduced. The new guidelines for polyclinics indicate that doctors can’t serve 
more than 2,500 patients, because in order to see more patients they have to spend less 
time with each patient and reduce the quality of medical care. When doctors take care of 
1,500 to 2,000 patients, they will get paid the full rate. If they serve less than 1,500, then 
they will get paid per patient and their income will decrease. If they receive more than 
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2,000 patients, their salary will increase for each additional patient, up to 2,500 patients. 
The ministry of health expects that this link of the compensation of doctors with the 
number of their patients will reward doctors who have good reputations and whose 
patients are eager to see them and will improve the quality of health care that the 
physicians are providing. The idea that patients have the right to choose their own family 
doctor is an important part of health care reform. (European, 2001)  
 
 
Improving Democracy and Health Care Through Community Participation 
 
Donor organizations, such as World Bank and USAID, emphasize the concept of 
community involvement. Many projects that are geared to improve primary health care, 
also promote active community participation in determining local health care priorities, 
supervising the implementation of the projects and providing basic health services. One 
USAID project required the community to form a Civic Action Group of 9-12 members 
of the community to determine the project that will be adopted and to supervise the 
implementation of this project. From 1995 to 2000, Civic Action Groups all over 
Armenia implemented 317 micro-projects. About 7% of these projects were health 
related, while 60 percent were related to drinking and irrigation network construction 
(USAID, 2002) Experiences in other countries indicate that forming a village health 
committee or community health volunteers could make health care more responsive to 
the needs of the patients, specially the poor. However, implementing participatory 
approaches on small-scale projects is easier to achieve than on large scale (ADB, 1999.) 
 During the Soviet Union period the public expected that the state would find 
solutions to their problems. Therefore, Armenia, similar to other former Soviet 
Republics, is experiencing a transition period, during which the public is beginning to 
take responsibility in organizing their communities and participate in solving their local 
difficulties. With increasing participation of the community members in the decisions of 
the local concerns, democracy spreads.  Community participation and growing 
democracy would reduce the level of corruption, because when the community is 
involved in the decisions and the supervisions of projects, informal payments and corrupt 
behaviors by health care officials would be more difficult.  
Decentralization of health care services increases the possibilities of community 
participation. Since the fall of Soviet Union, in transition economies the central 
governments still control the design of health care policies. However, the provision of 
health services is in some cases privatized and in other cases delegated to local 
authorities.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The poor in Armenia could have better access to health care if the government is 
successful in increasing government spending on health care.  
The goal is to increase public health expenditure and by the year 2015 bring it to 2.5 
percent of the GDP. At the same time some consolidation of hospitals should occur. The 
result of these two changes would generate the possibility to raise the salaries of medical 
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personnel, which would reduce the need for informal payment by the patients, specially 
the poor. Reduction of informal payments would induce the poor to use health care 
institutions and improve their health. Meanwhile the government should continue to 
emphasize the role of primary health care, continue to increase the funding of PHC 
service providers, and encourage communities to participate in designing and 
implementing health projects. At the same time, if the economy of Armenia continues to 
grow rapidly and per capita income increases, then eventually adopting an appropriate 
version of public health insurance will become feasible. The result of all these positive 
developments would improve the quality and availability of health services in Armenia 
and provide a better opportunity to the poor to get adequate health care. 
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